Chinese Indonesian (Indonesian: Chinese-Indonesian ) are Indonesians from various ethnic Chinese groups, especially Han Chinese.
The Chinese come to Indonesia as economic migrants in Southeast Asia. Their population grew rapidly during the colonial period when workers were contracted from their home province of southern China. Under the policy of Dutch ethnic classification, Chinese Indonesians are considered "foreigners"; thus, they are struggling to enter the social and political scene of colonial and national, regardless of success in their economic endeavors. Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians has occurred throughout Indonesia's history, although government policies implemented since 1998 have sought to remedy this. The hatred of ethnic Chinese economic talent grew in the 1950s when indigenous Indonesian traders felt they could not remain competitive. In some cases, the government's actions merely spread the stereotype that Chinese ethnic conglomerates are corrupt. Although the 1997 Asian financial crisis greatly disrupted their business activities, government policy reforms and laws abolished a number of political and social restrictions on Chinese Indonesians.
The development of local Chinese communities and cultures is based on three pillars: clan associations, ethnic media, and Mandarin schools. It developed during the period of Chinese nationalism in the last years of the Qing Dynasty of China and through the Second China-Japan War; However, differences in the goals of nationalist sentiment lead to divisions within the population. One group supports political reform in mainland China, while others work to improve status in local politics. The New Order government (1967-1998) uncovered the pillars of Chinese ethnic identity for assimilation policy as a solution to the "Chinese Problem". Patterns of assimilation and ethnic interaction can be found in Indonesian literature, architecture and cuisine.
The Chinese Sumatran population in Indonesia accounts for nearly half of the national population of the group. Although they are generally more urban than indigenous Indonesians, significant rural and agricultural communities exist throughout the country. Decreased fertility rates have resulted in an upward shift in the population pyramid, as median age increases. Emigration has contributed to a shrinking population, and society has emerged in more advanced countries in the second half of the 20th century. Some have participated in the repatriation program to the People's Republic of China, while others emigrated to neighboring Singapore and the West to avoid anti-Chinese sentiment. Among the overseas population, their identity feels more Indonesian than China.
Video Chinese Indonesians
Histori
Interaksi awal
The first recorded movement of people from China to the Southeast Asian Maritime was the arrival of Mongol troops under Kublai Khan which culminated in the Javanese invasion of 1293. Their intervention accelerated the decline of the classical kingdoms such as Singhasari and accelerated the rise of Majapahit. Empire.
Chinese Muslim traders from the east coast of China arrived in coastal cities of Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 15th century. They were led by sailor Zheng He, who led several expeditions to Southeast Asia between 1405 and 1430. In this book Yingya Shenglan , his translator Ma Huan documented the activities of Chinese Muslims in the archipelago and the legacy left behind by Zheng He and his men. These traders settled along the northern coast of Java, but no documentation of their settlements outside the 16th century. Chinese Muslims may have been absorbed into the majority of the Muslim population. Between 1450 and 1520, the interest of the Ming Dynasty in Southeast Asia reached its lowest point and trade, both legal and illegal, rarely reached the archipelago. The Portuguese did not mention any Chinese minority population when they arrived in Indonesia at the beginning of the 16th century. Trade from the north was reshaped when China legalized private trade in 1567 through licensing 50 junks a year. A few years later silver began to flow into the region, from Japan, Mexico, and Europe, and the trade flourished once more. Different Chinese colonies appear in hundreds of ports throughout Southeast Asia, including the pepper port in Banten.
Chinese merchants boycotted Portuguese Malacca after falling into Portuguese hands at the Capture of Malacca in 1511. The Chinese were involved in business with Malays and Javanese, not Portuguese. Some Chinese in Java helped Muslim efforts to reclaim the city by boat. The Java-Chinese participation in reclaiming Malacca is recorded in "The Malay Annals of Semarang and Cerbon".
Colonial attitude (1600-1900)
By the time the Dutch arrived at the beginning of the 17th century, large Chinese settlements were located along the northern coast of Java. Most are merchants and traders, but they also practice farming in the interior. The Dutch contracted many of these immigrants as skilled craftsmen in the construction of Batavia (Jakarta) on the northwest coast of Java. The newly created port was chosen as the new headquarters of the Dutch East India Company (VITEENIGD OOS), in the year Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie , VOC) 1609 by Jan Pieterszoon Coen. It grew into a major center for trade with China and India. Batavia became home to China's largest community in the archipelago and remained so in the 21st century. Coen and other previous Governors General promoted the entry of Chinese immigrants into new settlements "for the sake of those places and for the purpose of collecting spices such as cloves, nutmeg and nutmeg". The Chinese population at harbors 300-400 in 1619 had grown at least 10,000 by 1740. However, the Dutch introduced a racial classification system that separated Chinese descendants from other ancestors. The Dutch colonial government saw the rise of anti-Chinese policy.
Most of those who settled in the archipelago had severed their relationship with the land and welcomed favorable treatment and protection under the Dutch. Some became "income farmers," intermediaries in the VOC's corporate structure, in charge of collecting import-export duties and managing natural resource harvesting; although this was very profitable, he gained enmity of the indigenous population . Others work as opium farmers. After the Batavia massacre of 1740 and the ensuing war, in which China rebelled against the Dutch, the Dutch tried to place a quota on the number of Chinese who could enter the Indies. Amoy is designated as the only immigration port to the islands, and ships are limited to a certain number of crew and passengers depending on size. This quota is adjusted to meet the demand of foreign workers, as in July 1802 when sugar mills near Batavia needed workers.
The Chinese who married local Javanese women and converted to Islam created different Muslim Peranakan Chinese communities in Java. Chinese people rarely have to convert to marry Javanese abangan women but a large number of their descendants, and Batavian Muslims absorb Chinese Muslim communities who are descended from converts. The adoption of Islam at that time was a marker of peranakan status which no longer mattered. The Semaran Duke and Jayaningrat family are from China.
When the VOC was nationalized on December 31, 1799, much of China's freedom under the corporation was abolished by the Dutch government. Among them was the Chinese monopoly on the salt trade that the VOC administration had provided. The 1816 Rule introduced requirements for indigenous and Chinese residents traveling within the territory to obtain travel permits. Those who did not have permission to face arrests by security personnel. The Governor-General also introduced a resolution in 1825 that prohibited "foreign Asians in Java such as Malay, Bugis and Chinese" from living in the same neighborhood as the indigenous population. After the costly Java War (1825-1830), the Netherlands introduced a new agrarian and cultivation system that required farmers to "produce some of their fields and plant crops suitable for the European market". Cultivation is required to restore the colony economy, but ends the income farming system established under the VOC.
The Chinese are regarded as temporary residents and have difficulty in obtaining land rights. Europeans are prioritized in the selection of plantation areas, while colonial officials believe that the remaining plots should be protected and nourished for the indigenous population. Short-term and renewable rents of varying lengths were then introduced as temporary measures, but many Chinese remained on this land after the expiry of their contracts and became squatters. In the second half of the nineteenth century the colonial government began experimenting with the idea of ​​"Ethical Policy" to protect the indigenous population, which dumped China as "the main enemy of the state". Under the new policy, the government is stepping up restrictions on Chinese economic activity, which they believe exploits indigenous populations.
In western Borneo, China established their first major mining settlement in 1760. Expelling Dutch settlers and local Malay prince, they joined a new republic known as Lanfang. In 1819, they were in conflict with the new Dutch government and deemed "unsuitable" for its purposes, but indispensable for the development of the region. The Bangka-Belitung Islands are also examples of large settlements in rural areas. In 1851, 28 Chinese were listed on the islands and, by 1915, the population had risen to nearly 40,000 and the fishing and tobacco industries had grown. The cauldrons brought into the area after the end of the nineteenth century were largely employed from the Straits Settlements for recruiting obstacles in China.
Nationalism is divided (1900-1949)
The Chinese revolutionary figure Sun Yat-sen visited Southeast Asia in 1900, and, later that year, the socio-religious organization Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan ( ??? ? ), also known as the China Association, was established. Their goal was to urge ethnic Chinese in the Indies to support the revolutionary movement in China. In an attempt to build a Chinese-speaking school, the association argued that English and Mandarin teaching should be prioritized over the Netherlands, to provide themselves by taking, in the words of Phoa Keng Hek, "two or three-day voyages (Java- Singapore) to a wider world where they can move freely "and overcome their activity restrictions. Several years later, the Dutch authorities abandoned their segregation policies, abolished travel permits for ethnic Chinese, and allowed them to move freely throughout the colony. The Xinhua Revolution of 1911 and 1912 of the founding of the Republic of China coincided with the growing nationalist-nationalist movement in the Indies.
Although there was no recognizable nationalist movement among indigenous peoples until 1908, the Dutch authorities feared that nationalist sentiment would spread with the growing mix of ethnic associations, known as kongsi . In 1911, several members of Java from the association of Kong Sing in Surakarta broke away and clashed with ethnic Chinese. This incident led to the creation of the Sarekat Islam, the first organized national nationalist movement in the Indies. Indigenous groups see Chinese nationalist sentiments as "arrogant", which leads to mutual antagonism. Anti-Chinese sentiment spread throughout Java in 1918 and caused mass violence organized by members of the Sarekat Islam on Chinese ethnic in Kudus. Following this incident, the Chinese left-wing nationalist Sin Po newspaper asked the two sides to work together to improve living conditions as most ethnic Chinese, like most indigenous people, are poor.
Sin Po was first printed in 1910 and began gaining momentum as a major supporter of China's political nationalism in 1917. The Chinese who followed his school of thought rejected engagement with local institutions and would only participate in politics related to China mainland. The second stream was later formed by wealthy Chinese who received education in Dutch-run schools. The Dutch-oriented group hopes to increase participation in local politics, Dutch education for ethnic Chinese, and promote the ethnic Chinese economy in the colonial economy. Presented by Chinese representatives of the Volksraad, such as Hok Hoei Kan, Loa Sek Hie and Phoa Liong Gie, the movement gained momentum and culminated with the 1927 Chung Hwa Congress and the formation of Chung Hwa Hui's party in 1928, who chose Kan as its president. The editor of the news magazine editor Madjallah Panorama criticized Sin Po for misleading Chinese ethnicity by pressuring them into a Chinese-nationalist attitude.
In 1932, the Indonesian pro-Indonesian counterparts established the Indonesian Chinese Party to support the absorption of ethnic Chinese into the Javanese population and supported the call for self-government of Indonesia. Members of this group are primarily peranakan . This division reappears at the end of the Japanese occupation period (1942-1945). Under the occupation, Chinese ethnic communities were attacked by Japanese troops, partly because of suspicion that they detained Kuomintang sympathizers as a consequence of the Second Japan-Japan War. When the Dutch returned, after the end of World War II, the chaos caused by revolutionary revolutionary forces and reverses also saw radical Muslim groups attacking Chinese ethnic communities.
Although revolutionary leaders are sympathetic to ethnic Chinese, they can not stop sporadic violence. Those affected escaped from the countryside into Dutch-controlled cities, a movement many Indonesians see as evidence of pro-Dutch sentiment. There is evidence, however, that Chinese Indonesians are represented and participate in independence efforts. Four members of the Investigation Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPK) and one member of the Indonesian Independence Preparation Committee (PPKI) have Chinese names.
Loyalty in question (1950-1966)
The Netherlands abandoned its territorial claims in the archipelago (with the exception of West Papua) after the Round Table Conference of 1949, which was the same year when the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to take over mainland China. Most Chinese Indonesians consider China as communist less attractive than newly independent Indonesia, but in the archipelago their loyalty is questionable. The ethnic Chinese born in the Dutch East Indies whose parents are domiciled under Dutch rule are considered new citizens in accordance with the principle of soli juice, or "land rights". However, Chinese law regards a person as a Chinese citizen in accordance with the principle of sanguine juice, or the right of blood. This means that all Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent are also claimed to be citizens by the People's Republic of China. After several attempts by both governments to resolve the issue, Indonesia and China signed the Double Citizenship Agreement on the sidelines of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung. One of the provisions is the ability to renounce Chinese citizenship for those who wish to remain Indonesian citizens.
As many as 390,000 ethnic Chinese, two thirds of those who have legitimate claims to Indonesian citizenship abandoned their Chinese status when the treaty came into force in 1962. On the other hand, an estimated 60,000 Chinese students went to the People's Republic of China in the 1950s and early 1960s. The first wave of students was almost fully educated in Chinese schools, but could not find opportunities for higher education in Indonesia. Looking for a quality scientific profession, they enter China with great hopes for their future and that from the mainland. Subsequent migration took place in 1960 as part of a repatriation program and in 1965-1966 following a series of anti-communist violence which also attracted anger against ethnic Chinese. As many as 80 percent of the original students who entered the mainland eventually became refugees in Hong Kong. Under the program of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Chinese who returned abroad were questioned for their allegiance because of their foreign connections. Since most were raised in urban environments they were sent to villages, told to "rebel against their own class background", and eventually lost contact with their families. They are attacked as "imperialists", "capitalists", "spies", "half-breeds", and "foreign devils".
In 1959, after the introduction of a soft-authoritarian government through Guided Democracy, the Indonesian government and the military began to place restrictions on the residence and trafficking of foreigners. This regulation culminated in the enactment of Presidential Decree 10 in November 1959, banning retail services by non-indigenous people in rural areas. Ethnic Chinese, Arab and Dutch entrepreneurs are specifically targeted during their enforcement to provide a more lucrative market for indigenous businesses. The move was greeted with protests from the Chinese government and some Indonesian people. The Javanese writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer later criticized the policy in his 1961 book Hoakiau in Indonesia. The integration movement, led by the Chinese-Indonesian Baperki ( Indonesian Citizenship Consulting Board ), began to garner 1963 interest, including President Sukarno. However, a string of attacks on Chinese ethnic communities in West Java in May proved to be short-lived, despite government criticism of the violence. When Baperki was branded a communist organization in 1965, ethnic Chinese were involved by the association; this is exacerbated in the public mind by communism of the People's Republic of China. As many as 500,000 people, the majority of them are Abangan Javanese Muslims and Balinese Indonesians but belong to a minority of several thousand ethnic Chinese, killed in anti-communist purge following the failure of the coup, suspected of being a communist. led, on September 30, 1965.
Managing "Chinese Issues" ( 1967-1998)
When Suharto's New Order government ruled from 1966-1967, he introduced a political system based solely on the ideology of Pancasila (five principles). To prevent the ideological battle that occurred during Sukarno's presidency resumed, the "Pancasila democracy" Soeharto sought a depoliticizing system in which discussions to form a cohesive ethnic Chinese identity were no longer allowed. A government committee was formed in 1967 to examine various aspects of the "Chinese Problem" ( Chinese Problem ) and agree that forced emigration the whole community is not a solution: "The challenge is to take advantage of their economic talents while eliminating their perceived economic dominance." The semi-governmental institution for the National Unity Promotion (LPKB) was formed to advise the government in facilitating the assimilation of people Indonesian Chinese. This process is done by highlighting the differences between ethnic Chinese and indigenous native , rather than looking for similarities. The expression of Chinese culture through traditional languages, religions and festivals is prohibited and ethnic Chinese are pressed to adopt sounding names in Indonesia.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Suharto and his government brought Chinese Indonesian businesses to participate in the New Order's economic development program while keeping them vulnerable to strengthening central authority and restricting political freedoms. The patron-client relationship, especially through the exchange of money for security, became the accepted norm among ethnic Chinese because they maintained a social contract in which they could claim ownership in the country. A small proportion of Indonesia's economic elites, both non-Chinese, have links to Suharto's family members and members of the military for protection, while small business owners rely on local law enforcement officers. Stereotypes from wealthy minorities become accepted as a common fact but fail to admit that these entrepreneurs are few in number compared to small traders and shopkeepers. In a 1989 interview conducted by scholar Adam Schwarz for his book A Nation in Waiting: The Search for Indonesia for Stability , an interviewee stated that, "For most Indonesians, the word 'China' is synonymous with corruption ' €. The economic role of ethnic Chinese is contradictory because it is not translated to accept their status in a larger society. They are politically weak and often face social abuse.
Anti-Chinese sentiment collected intensity until the 1990s. President Suharto gathered the most powerful entrepreneurs - mostly Chinese Indonesians - in a 1990 national television meeting at his private ranch, calling on them to donate 25 percent of their shares to the cooperative. The commentators describe the spectacle as a "good theater", as it only serves to reinforce the hatred and suspicion of ethnic Chinese among indigenous populations. Major unrest occurred in Situbondo (October 1996), Tasikmalaya (December 1996), and Rengasdengklok (January 1997).
When Suharto entered his seventh tenure as president, following an indisputable election on March 10, 1998, Indonesian students embarked on a series of large demonstrations in protest against the New Order regime that continued for weeks and culminated in the shooting of four students by security forces at Trisakti University in in May. The incident sparked major violence in several cities during May 12-15. Property and businesses owned by Chinese Indonesians were targeted by the mafia, and more than 100 women were sexually assaulted; this aspect of the riots, although generally accepted as true, has been rejected by some Indonesian groups. Without security forces, large groups of men, women and children looted and set fire to a number of shopping centers in major cities. In Jakarta and Surakarta more than 1,000 people - both Chinese and non-Chinese - died in shopping malls. Tens of thousands of Chinese people fled the country after these events, and bankers estimate that US $ 20 billion in capital had left the country in 1997-1999 to overseas destinations such as Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States.
Social Policy Reform (1999-present)
Suharto suddenly resigned on May 21, 1998, one week after he returned from a meeting of the Group of 15 in Cairo, which took place during the riots. The reformasi government formed by his successor, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, started a campaign to rebuild the confidence of Chinese Indonesians who fled the country, especially businessmen. Together with one of his envoys James Riady, the son of Mochtar Riady's financial figure, Habibie appealed to Chinese Chinese seeking refuge throughout East Asia, Australia and North America to return and promise security from various government ministries and other political figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais. Despite Habibie's efforts, he was skeptical of the statements he made, as Vice President and as President, suggesting that the message was not sincere. A special envoy describes Chinese Indonesians as key to restoring "indispensable" capital and economic activity, prioritizing entrepreneurs as the target of their application. Others, including economist Kwik Kian Gie, see government efforts as perpetuating the myth of China's economic dominance rather than asserting ethnic Chinese identity.
The symbolic reform of Chinese Indonesian rights under Habibie's government was carried out through two Presidential Instructions. The first abolished the use of the native " indigenous " and "non-indigenous " terms in official government documents and businesses. The second abolished the ban on Mandarin Mandarin studies and reaffirmed the 1996 instruction that eliminated the use of SBKRI to identify Chinese citizens. Habibie set up a task force to investigate the May 1998 violence, although his government later rejected his findings. As an additional legal measure, Indonesia has ratified the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on 25 May 1999. In 2000, the newly elected President Wahid abolished the ban on the Chinese public cultural exhibition and allowed the Chinese tradition to be practiced freely, without the need for permission. Two years later President Megawati Soekarnoputri declared that Chinese New Year ( Lunar ) will be marked as a national holiday from 2003 In addition Habibie's directive on the term "native", the legislature passed a new citizenship law in 2006 defining the original word (/native) in the Constitution as a natural born person, allowing Chinese Indonesians to be eligible for run for president. The law further stipulates that foreign children born in Indonesia are eligible to apply for Indonesian citizenship.
The post-Suharto era saw the end of discriminatory policies against Chinese Indonesians. Since then, a number of Chinese Indonesians have begun to take part in the government's politics, government, and state sectors. The Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) sees Indonesia's first woman minister Mari Elka Pangestu as Minister of Trade (2004-2011) and Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy (2011-2014). Another well-known Chinese character in Indonesia in Indonesian politics is Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or known as Ahok. Former East Belitung Regent (2005-2006) and first governor of Jakarta (2014-2017) Chinese descent.
However, discrimination and prejudice continue and increase. On March 15, 2016, for example, Indonesian Army General Surya Prabowo commented that the ruling Jakarta governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, should "know the place should not China China face the consequences of its actions". This controversial comment is considered to have listened to previous violence against the Chinese Indonesians.
Maps Chinese Indonesians
Origins
Chinese immigrants to the Indonesian archipelago are almost entirely from Han ethnic groups who are now the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong in southern China, an area known for their regional diversity. A large number of Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in the world, live in Southeast Asia. Almost all Chinese Indonesians are patrilineal descendants of these early immigrants or new immigrants born in mainland China.
As the first group of Chinese settlers in large numbers, the southern Fujian Hokkien became the dominant immigrant group until the mid-19th century. Their maritime-mercantile culture comes from their trade work while in Indonesia. Hokkiens descendants are the dominant group in eastern Indonesia, Central and East Java and the west coast of Sumatra. Teochews, Hokkien's southern neighbor, is found along the east coast of Sumatra, in the Riau Islands, and in western Borneo. They are preferred as plantation workers in Sumatra but have become traders in areas where Hokkien is not well represented.
Hakka, unlike Hokkien and Teochew, is from the hinterland of the mountains of Guangdong and lacks a maritime culture. Due to unproductive areas in their home region, Hakka emigrated out of economic necessity in several waves from 1850 to 1930 and was the poorest Chinese immigrant group. Although initially they filled the mining centers in western Kalimantan and Bangka Island, Hakka became interested in the rapid growth of Batavia and West Java at the end of the 19th century.
Cantonese, like Hakka, are known throughout Southeast Asia as miners. Their migration in the 19th century was mostly directed to the Bangka tin mine, off the east coast of Sumatra. Famous traditionally as a skilled craftsman, Cantonese benefit from close ties with Europeans in Guangdong and Hong Kong by learning about machines and industry success. They migrate to Java around the same time as Hakka but for different reasons. In cities in Indonesia, they become craftsmen, machine workers, and small business owners such as restaurants and hotel maintenance services. Canton is evenly spread across the archipelago and is much less than Hokkien or Hakka. As a result, their role becomes a secondary interest in the Chinese community.
Demographics
The 2000 census in Indonesia reported 2,411,503 residents (1.20 percent of the total population) as ethnic Chinese. An additional 93.717 (0.05 percent) of ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia are reported as foreign nationals, mostly from the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, who may not be able to pay fees to become Indonesian citizens. Because the census uses self-identification methods, those who refuse to identify themselves as ethnic Chinese, or have assumed the identity of other ethnic groups, are recorded as non-Chinese. It is also possible that some people did not identify themselves for fear of impact after anti-Chinese violence in 1998, as some censuses state that there are about 6 to 7 million Chinese living in Indonesia.
The past estimates of the exact number of Chinese Indonesians depended on the 1930s Indies-Dutch census, which gathered direct information on ethnicity. The census reported 1.23 million self-identified Chinese in the colony, representing 2.03 percent of the total population, and considered an accurate account of the group's population. Ethnic information will not be collected again until the 2000 census and inferred from other census data, such as spoken and religious affiliation, during the middle years. In a preliminary survey of the Chinese minority of China, anthropologist G. William Skinner estimated that between 2.3 million (2.4 percent) and 2.6 million (2.7 percent) lived in Indonesia in 1961. Former foreign minister Adam Malik gave a figure of 5 million in a report published daily in the Daily Indonesia daily in 1973. Many media and academic sources then estimate between 4 and 5 percent of the total population as ethnic Chinese regardless of the year. Estimates during the 2000s have placed between 6 and 7 million, and the Foreign Compt's Overseas Competition Committee estimates the population as high as 7.67 million in 2006.
According to the 2010 population census, 22.3 percent of Chinese Indonesians live in the capital city of Jakarta, located on the island of Java. When other provinces on the island - Banten, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java - were included, this population accounted for about half (51.8 percent) of all Chinese Indonesians. This data does not count the number of ethnic Chinese who have foreign citizenship. West Kalimantan has about 8.15 percent of the population is ethnic Chinese, followed by Bangka-Belitung Islands (8.14 percent), Riau Islands (7.66 percent), Jakarta (6.58 percent), North Sumatra (5.75 percent ), Riau (1.84 percent). In each of the remaining provinces, Chinese Chinese accounted for 1 percent or less of the provincial population. Most Chinese Indonesians in North Sumatra live in the provincial capital of Medan; they are one of the main ethnic groups in the city with Batak and Javanese, but in this province they are only a small percentage because of the relatively large population in the province, a considerable Chinese population is also present in Binjai, Tanjungbalai and Pematangsiantar. city. Bangka-Belitung, West Kalimantan, and Riau are grouped around the economic centers of ethnic Chinese in Singapore and, with the exception of Bangka-Belitung, these settlements existed long before the founding of Singapore in 1819.
The Chinese ethnic population in Indonesia grew an average of 4.3 percent per year between 1920 and 1930. It then slowed down due to the effects of the Great Depression and many areas experiencing net emigration. The fall in growth rates is also attributed to the decline in the number of Chinese immigrants who have entered Indonesia since the 1950s. The population is relatively long according to the 2000 census, has the lowest percentage of population below 14 years old across the country and the second highest percentage of population above 65. Their population pyramid has a narrow base with a rapid increase up to the age of 15-19 years. group, showing a rapid decline in total fertility rates. This is evidenced by the decline in the number of absolute births since 1980. In Jakarta and West Java, the peak population occurs in the age group of 20-24, which indicates that the decline in birth rates started since 1975. The upper part of the pyramid shows a subtle decline with increasing age of the population. It is estimated that 60.7 percent of the Indonesian Chinese population in 2000 was a generation under political and social pressure under the New Order government. With an average life expectancy of 75 years, those who spend their formative years before this regime will be completely lost by 2032.
According to the last 2010 population census, the identifiable Chinese Chinese population was 2,832,510. There was a 17.5% growth from the 2000 census.
Emigrant community
New migrants began to move from Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries to more advanced regions around the world in the second half of the 20th century. Although these migrants have Chinese inheritance, they are often not identified as such; This trend continues into modern times. There are some independent estimates made from Chinese Indonesians living in other countries. James Jupp The Australian People encyclopedia estimates that half of the more than 30,000 Indonesians living in Australia in the late 1990s are ethnic Chinese, and they have since joined other Chinese communities. In New Zealand, many migrants live in Auckland suburbs after 1,500 seek asylum from the 1998 upheaval, of which two-thirds are given shelter.
Australian intellectual Charles Coppel believes that Chinese Indonesian migrants are also the overwhelming majority of Chinese who return to live in Hong Kong. While it is not possible to calculate this amount accurately, news sources have provided estimates ranging from 100,000 to 150,000, while an estimated 150,000 were published in Hong Kong Standard on December 21, 1984. (Coppel 2002, p. ).
Of the 57,000 Indonesians living in the United States in 2000, a third were estimated to be ethnic Chinese. Welcoming local immigrants in Southern California estimate that 60 percent of Indonesian Americans living in the area are of Chinese descent. Their families usually live in Indonesia for generations and may marry "natives". In Canada, only a small proportion of Chinese Chinese are emigrants who speak Mandarin. Although families are interested in rediscovering their ethnic traditions, their Canadian-born children are often reluctant to learn Indonesian or Chinese.
Society
This can be expressed as a general rule that if a certain area in Indonesia was settled by a considerable number of Chinese before the 20th century, Chinese society was at some level dichotomized today. In one sector of society, adults and children are born in Indonesia, orientation towards China is weakened, and the influence of individual culture is evident. In other sectors of society, the population consists of twentieth-century immigrants and their direct descendants, which are less acculturated and stronger oriented toward China. The significance and stability of social lines between the two sectors varies from one part of Indonesia to another.
Scholars who study Chinese Indonesians often differentiate group members based on their racial and sociocultural backgrounds: "full-blooded" and "peranakan" . " Both terms were originally used to distinguish pure-blooded Chinese races from those with mixed ancestors. The secondary meaning of later terms means " totok " born in China and whoever was born in Indonesia is considered "peranakan ". Segmentation in the "totok peranakans segments are occurring through social classes, judged on the basis of education and family status rather than wealth.
Gender and Kinship
The kinship structure in the totok community follows the patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal tradition of Chinese society, a practice that has lost its emphasis on "peranakan" family relationships. In contrast, the pattern of kinship in indigenous families has included matrilocal, matrilineal, and matrifocal traditions found in Javanese society. In this community, both sons and daughters can inherit family wealth, including tablets and ancestral ashes. Political, social, and economic authority in "peranakan" families is more equally distributed between the sexes than in the "full-blooded" family. The term kin does not distinguish between maternal and paternal relatives and polygyny is well-liked. Western influence in "peranakan" societies is evidenced by the high proportion of spouses without children. Those with children also have fewer than "full-blooded couples".
Though they broke from the traditional kinship pattern, " peranakan " families are closer to some traditional Chinese values ​​than "totok ". Since indigenous populations have lost many connections to their ancestral homes in China's coastal provinces, they are less affected by the twentieth-century modernization patterns that alter the region. The "peranakans" have a stricter attitude towards divorce, although the rate of separation among families in both segments is generally lower than other ethnic groups. Regulated marriages are more common in "peranakan" families, whose relationships tend to be more nepotistic. Secularization among "totok" means that their counterparts perform ancestral rituals to a higher level, and "peranakan" youth tend to be more religious. Through the education provided by Catholic and Protestant schools of high quality, these youths are far more likely to convert to Christianity.
In the 21st century, Chinese "peranakan" peripheral "conceptual" and "peripheral" distinctions are slowly becoming obsolete as some families show a mixture of characteristics from both cultures. Interracial marriage and cultural assimilation often prevent the establishment of precise definitions of Chinese Indonesians in line with simple racial criteria. The use of Chinese surnames, in some forms or circumstances, is generally a sign of cultural self-identification as ethnic Chinese or alignment with the Chinese social system.
Identity
Ethnic Chinese in the 1930s Indies census was categorized as foreign orientation, which led to separate registration. Citizenship was granted to ethnic Chinese through the 1946 citizenship law after Indonesian independence, and was further reaffirmed in 1949 and 1958. However, they often encountered obstacles related to the legality of their citizenship. Chinese Indonesians are required to produce Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBI) when conducting business with government officials. Without SBKRI, they can not make passports and identity cards ( Identity Card , KTP); registering birth certificates, deaths, and marriage certificates; or registering a business license. Requirements for its use were abolished in 1996 through presidential directives reaffirmed in 1999, but media sources reported that local authorities are still demanding SBKRI from Chinese Indonesians after the instruction comes into force.
Other terms used to identify the community sectors include peranakan and totok . The first, traditionally used to describe those born locally, comes from the Indonesian root child ("child" ) and thus means "son of the land". The latter comes from the Javanese language, which means "new" or "pure", and is used to describe born and new immigrants. A large number of Chinese Indonesians also live in the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong; they are considered part of the "returning Chinese population" ( ??? ). To identify the various sectors of the Chinese Indonesian community, Tan argues that they must be differentiated by citizenship into host nationals and those who are foreign residents, then broken down by their cultural orientation and social identification. In his doctoral dissertation, Aimee Dawis notes that such a definition, based on cultural affinity and not the country of origin, has obtained currency since the early 1990s, although the old definition is sometimes used.
Sociologist Mely G. Tan asserts that scholars who study Chinese ethnic emigrants often refer to this group as "monolithic entities": overseas Chinese. Such treatment also takes place in Indonesia; the majority of residents call it the Chinese text or Chinese> (both mean "Chinese", ??? ), or < span lang = "id" title = "English text"> hoakiau ( ?? ). They were previously described in ethnographic literature as Chinese Indonesians, but there has been a shift in terminology because the old description emphasizes the Chinese origins of the group, while newer, the integration of Indonesia. Aimee Dawis, citing prominent scholar Leo Suryadinata, believes that the shift was "important to eliminate prejudice that they are an exclusive group" and also "promote a sense of nationalism" among them. Economic proficiency
"Totok" community members are more likely to be entrepreneurs and adhere to the guanxi practice, based on the idea that one's existence is affected by connections to others, implying the importance of the connection business. In the first decade after Indonesian independence, their business position became stronger after being limited to small businesses in the colonial period. By 1950 almost all retail stores in Indonesia were owned by ethnic Chinese businessmen, whose business ranged from selling foodstuffs to building materials. Dissatisfaction soon grew among indigenous traders who felt unable to compete with ethnic Chinese businesses. Under pressure from indigenous traders, the government imposed Benteng and Presidential Regulation 10 of 1959, which imposes restrictions on Chinese ethnic importers and rural retailers. The ethnic Chinese business survives, because of their integration into the larger networks throughout Southeast Asia, and their dominance continues despite continuous state and private efforts to encourage the growth of indigenous capital. The Chinese business of Indonesia is part of a larger bamboo network, an overseas Chinese business network operating in the Southeast Asian market that shares the same family and cultural ties.
Government policy shifted dramatically after 1965, becoming more profitable for economic expansion. In an effort to rehabilitate the economy, the government turns to those who have the ability to invest and expand the company's activities. The Chinese ethnic capitalist, called the cukong , was supported by the military, which emerged as the dominant political force after 1965. Indigenous entrepreneurs once again demanding greater government investment support in the 1970s, but legislative efforts failed to reduce Chinese ethnic dominance. In a 1995 study published by the Australian Department of East Asia's Department of East Asian Analysis, about 73 percent of the market capitalization value of public companies (excluding foreign and state-owned companies) was owned by Chinese Indonesians. In addition, they had 68 percent of the top 300 conglomerates and nine of the top ten private sector groups by the end of 1993. This figure spreads the common belief that ethnic Chinese - estimated at 3 percent of the population - controlled 70 percent of the economy. Although the accuracy of this figure is disputed, it is evident that wealth differences exist along ethnic boundaries. The image of a strong ethnic Chinese community is increasingly economically nurtured by the government through its inability to break away from patronage networks. The Hokchia group dominated the business world of ethnic Chinese during the Suharto government, although other groups emerged after 1998.
The top five conglomerates in Indonesia before the 1997 Asian financial crisis - Salim Group, Astra International, Sinar Mas Group, Gudang Garam, Sampoerna and Lippo Group - are all owned by ethnic Chinese, with annual sales of Rp112 trillion (US $ 47 billion). When the crisis finally hit the country, the rupiah slumped heavily disrupting the company's operations. Many conglomerates lost most of their assets and collapsed. Over the next few years, other conglomerates are struggling to pay off international and domestic debt. The reforms introduced after 1998 were intended to keep the economy from oligarchic arrangements established under the New Order; however, the reform plan proved too optimistic. When President B.Ã, J. Habibie announced in an interview on July 19, 1998 with The Washington Post that Indonesia did not rely on ethnic Chinese businessmen, the value of the rupiah fell 5 percent. This unexpected reaction prompted an immediate change in policy, and Habibie soon began to attract the conglomerate for their support in the reform plan. Most initially feared democratization, but the process of social demarginalization meant that ethnic Chinese were regarded as members of the same society for the first time in the nation's history. Increased regional autonomy allows surviving conglomerates to explore new opportunities in the outer provinces, and economic reforms create a more free market.
Political activity
Between the 18th and early 20th centuries, Chinese ethnic communities were dominated by the presence of "peranakans". This period was followed by the growth of the "totok" community. As part of resinization efforts by indigenous ethnic Chinese communities, a new pan-Chinese movement emerged with the aim of China's unified political identity. The movement then broke out in 1920 when the "peranakan" elite rejected "totok" leadership in the nationalist movement, and the two groups developed their own goals. When it became clear that unification had been achieved with the term "totok", the "peranakan" leaders chose to harmonize their community with the Dutch, who had abandoned the separation policy in 1908. Both communities once again found common ground in opposing the invasion. Japan when the occupying forces treated all Chinese groups with contempt.
The question of nationality, after independence, politicized Chinese ethnicity and led to the establishment of Baperki in 1954, as the first and largest Chinese mass organization of Indonesia. Baperki and the majority of his "peranakan" members lead opposition to a bill that would limit the number of ethnic Chinese who can earn Indonesian citizenship. The movement was populated by the Islamic Masyumi Party in 1956 when it called for the implementation of affirmative action for indigenous businesses. During the 1955 legislative elections, Baperki received 178,887 votes and won seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). Later that year, two Baperki candidates were also elected to the Constitutional Assembly.
Ethnic-based political parties are banned under President Soeharto, leaving only three indigenous parties dominated by Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The depoliticization of Indonesian society limits Chinese ethnic activity to the economic sector. The Indonesian Chinese critics of the regime were mostly "peranakans" and projected themselves as Indonesians, leaving ethnic Chinese without a visible leader. On the eve of the 1999 legislative elections, following Suharto's resignation, Tempo news magazine conducted a survey of Chinese voters in their chosen political party for elections. Although respondents were able to vote for more than one party, 70 percent preferred the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), whose image of the nationalist party was considered beneficial to ethnic Chinese. The party also benefited from the presence of economist Kwik Kian Gie, who was respected by ethnic Chinese and non-ethnic Chinese voters.
New ethnic political parties such as the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (PDI), and PARTI) and Bhinneka Tunggal Indonesia Ika Party (PI) The Indonesian Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI) failed to gain much support in the 1999 election. Despite these results, the number of Chinese candidates Indonesia participating in national elections increased from less than 50 in 1999 to nearly 150 in 2004. Of the 58 Chinese candidates who ran for representation from Jakarta in the 2009 legislative elections, two won seats.
Culture
Language
Four main Chinese-speaking groups are represented in Indonesia: Hokkien-Taiwan (Min Min, Min Nan), Mandarin, Hakka and Cantonese. In addition, the Teochew people speak with their own dialect which has a level of understanding along with Hokkien. The differences between the two, however, stand out outside their home region. There are approximately 2.2 million native speakers of various Chinese varieties in Indonesia in 1982: 1.300,000 speakers of South Min varieties (including Hokkien and Teochew); 640,000 speakers of Hakka; 460,000 Chinese speakers; 180,000 Cantonese speakers; and 20,000 speakers from the varieties of Eastern Min (including the Fuzhou dialect). In addition, about 20,000 speak with different Indonesian dialects.
Many Chinese living in the capital city of Jakarta and other cities located in Java are not fluent in Chinese, due to the Chinese ban by the New Order, but those living in non-Javanese cities, especially in Sumatra and Kalimantan, can speak Chinese and dialect are fluent. The Chinese along the North-East coast of Sumatra, especially in North Sumatra, Riau, Riau Islands and Jambi are dominated by Hokkien-Taiwan (Min Nan) speakers, and there are also two different variants of the Hokkien-Taiwanese language used, such as Medan Hokkien , which is based on Zhangzhou and Riau Hokkien dialects, which are based on the Quanzhou dialect. There are also Hokkien speakers in Java, Sulawesi and Kalimantan (Borneo). Meanwhile, Hakka is the majority in Aceh, Bangka-Belitung and West Kalimantan in the north of Pontianak. Some Hakka also live in parts of Java. Cantons mainly live in big cities like Jakarta, Medan, Batam, Surabaya and Pontianak. The Teochew people make up the majority in West Kalimantan, especially in the Central to South regions such as Ketapang, Kendawangan and Pontianak, as well as in the Riau Islands. There are several speakers of Fuzhounese in East Java, especially in Surabaya.
Many Indonesians, including ethnic Chinese, believe in the Malay dialect, Chinese Malay, locally known as Chinese Chinese Malay > or Malay Chinese . The growth of "peranakan" literature in the second half of the nineteenth century gave rise to such variants, popularized through martial arts translated from Chinese or written in Malay and Indonesian. However, scholars argue it differs from a mixture of Javanese and oral Malay which is considered "spoken exclusively by ethnic Chinese".
[E] xcept for some loan words from China, there is nothing about 'Chinese Chinese' typical Chinese. The language is only low, the Malay bazaar, the common tongue of the streets and the Java market, especially the towns, are spoken by all ethnic groups in urban and multi-ethnic environments. Because China is a dominant element in cities and markets, the language is associated with them, but government officials, Eurasians, migrant traders, or people from different language areas all use this Malay form to communicate.
The academic literature on Chinese Malay generally notes that ethnic Chinese do not speak the same Malay dialect throughout the archipelago. Further, although the Dutch colonial government first introduced the Malay orthography in 1901, Chinese newspapers did not follow this standard until after independence. Because of these factors, ethnic Chinese played an "important role" in the development of modern Indonesian as the largest group during the colonial period to communicate in various Malay dialects.
Literature
The influence of Chinese culture can be seen in the local Chinese literary literature, dating back to the late 19th century. One of the earliest and most comprehensive works on this subject, 1981 Claudine Salmon Literature in Malay by Chinese Indonesian: A Temporary Interlocking Bibliography , lists over 3,000 works. This literary sample is also published in a collection of six volumes entitled Literary Chinese Tionghoa and Indonesian Nationality Indonesia ").
Kho Ping Hoo or Asmaraman Sukowati Kho Ping Hoo is a very beloved Chinese writer of Chinese descent. He is famous in Indonesia for martial arts fiction in Chinese or Javanese background. During his 30-year career, at least 120 stories have been published (according to Leo Suryadinata). However, the magazine Forum claims at least Kho Ping Hoo has 400 stories with a Chinese background and 50 stories with a Javanese background.
Media
All Chinese publications are prohibited under the Suharto-era assimilation policy, with the exception of the government-controlled daily newspaper Harian Indonesia . The abrogation of the Chinese ban after 1998 encouraged older Chinese Indonesians to promote its use to the younger generation; according to the Malaysian-Chinese researchers from the Chinese diaspora, Chang-Yau Hoon, they believe they will be "influenced by Chinese cultural values ​​and Confucian values". One debate took place in the media in 2003, discussing Chinese "mu yu" ( ?? , "mother tongue") and Indonesian " guo yu "( ?? ," national language "). Nostalgia is a common theme in the Chinese-language press in the period immediately after the Suharto government. The rise of political and economic standing of China at the turn of the 21st century has been a boost to their efforts to attract younger readers who seek to rediscover their cultural roots.
During the first three decades of the 20th century, ethnic Chinese had most, if not all, cinemas in towns throughout the Dutch East Indies. The films from China were imported by the 1920s, and the film industry began to emerge in 1928 with the arrival of three Wong brothers from Shanghai - their film will dominate the market until the 1930s. These earliest films almost exclusively focus on Chinese ethnic communities, although some examine inter-ethnic relations as the main theme. Further prohibition on the use of Chinese by the public means imported films and television programs should be dubbed in English with subtitles in Indonesian. When the martial arts series began to appear on national television in 1988, they were dubbed in Indonesian. One exception is the screening of films from Hong Kong in Chinese - confined to ethnic Chinese areas and beyond - due to an agreement between the importer and the film censorship board.
Religion
There is little scientific work devoted to the religious life of Chinese Indonesians. The 1977 French book Les Chinois de Jakarta: Temples et Vie Collective ("The Chinese Tionghoa: Temple and Collective Life" ) is the only major study to assess Chinese ethnic Chinese life in Indonesia. The Ministry of Religion provides official status to six religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The 2006 civil registration law does not allow Indonesians to identify themselves as members of other religions on their identity cards.
According to census data, nearly 80 percent of Chinese Indonesians are Buddhist or Christian (Catholic and Protestant). Chinese Indonesians tend to be more Christian than other ethnic Chinese groups in Southeast Asia for complex historical reasons. Throughout the 20th century Chinese religion and culture were forbidden and persecuted in Indonesia, forcing many Chinese to convert to Christianity. The first wave of repentance occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, and the number of ethnic Chinese Christians during this period increased fourfold. The second wave followed after the government withdrew Confucian status as a recognized religion in the 1970s. Suharto supported the systematic campaign against the eradication of Confucianism. As a result, many Chinese in Jakarta and other parts of Java are mostly Christian, while in non-Javanese cities such as Medan, Pontianak and other parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan are still obedient to Buddhism, and some still practice Taoism, Confucianism and other traditional Chinese beliefs.
In a country where nearly 90 percent of the population is Muslim, ethnic Chinese Muslims form a small minority of Chinese ethnic populations. Census 2010 estimates that 3.6% of Chinese Indonesians are followers of Islam. Associations such as the Chinese Muslim Organization in Indonesia (PITI) existed at the end of the 19th century. PITI was re-established in 1963 as a modern organization, but sometimes experiences periods of inactivity. The Confucian Religion in Indonesia ( Confucian Chamber of Religion of Indonesia , MATAKIN) estimates that 95 percent of Confucian is ethnic Chinese; most of the remaining 5 percent are ethnic Javanese converts. Although the government has restored Confucian status as a recognized religion, many local rulers did not obey it and refused to allow Chinese ethnicity to include it as a religion on their identity cards. Local officials remain unaware that a civil registration law legally permits residents to leave the religious section on their identity cards vacant.
Architecture
Various forms of Chinese architecture exist throughout Indonesia with striking differences between urban and rural areas and between different islands. The development of architecture by Chinese in Southeast Asia is different from that in mainland China. By integrating local and European (Dutch) design patterns, many variations of fusion styles appear. Chinese architecture in Indonesia has been manifested in three forms: religious temples, study rooms, and houses. The cities during the colonial period were divided into three racial districts: European, Oriental (Arabic, Chinese and other Asian), and native. There is usually no physical limit d
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